keyctl - manipulate the kernel's key management facility
Standard C library (libc
, -lc
)
Alternatively, Linux Key Management Utilities (libkeyutils
,
-lkeyutils
); see VERSIONS.
#include <linux/keyctl.h> /* Definition of KEY* constants */
#include <sys/syscall.h> /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
#include <unistd.h>
long syscall(SYS_keyctl, int operation, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
unsigned long arg5);
Note
: glibc provides no wrapper for
keyctl(), necessitating the use of
syscall(2).
keyctl() allows user-space programs to perform key manipulation.
The operation performed by keyctl() is determined by
the value of the operation
argument. Each of these operations
is wrapped by the libkeyutils
library (provided by the
keyutils
package) into individual functions (noted below) to
permit the compiler to check types.
The permitted values for operation
are:
Map a special key ID to a real key ID for this process.
This operation looks up the special key whose ID is provided in
arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). If the special key is
found, the ID of the corresponding real key is returned as the function
result. The following values may be specified in arg2
:
This specifies the calling thread's thread-specific keyring. See thread-keyring(7).
This specifies the caller's process-specific keyring. See process-keyring(7).
This specifies the caller's session-specific keyring. See session-keyring(7).
This specifies the caller's UID-specific keyring. See user-keyring(7).
This specifies the caller's UID-session keyring. See user-session-keyring(7).
This specifies the authorization key created by request_key(2) and passed to the process it spawns to generate a key. This key is available only in a request-key(8)-style program that was passed an authorization key by the kernel and ceases to be available once the requested key has been instantiated; see request_key(2).
This specifies the key ID for the request_key(2) destination keyring. This keyring is available only in a request-key(8)-style program that was passed an authorization key by the kernel and ceases to be available once the requested key has been instantiated; see request_key(2).
The behavior if the key specified in arg2
does not exist
depends on the value of arg3
(cast to int
). If
arg3
contains a nonzero value, then—if it is appropriate to do
so (e.g., when looking up the user, user-session, or session key)—a new
key is created and its real key ID returned as the function result.
Otherwise, the operation fails with the error
ENOKEY.
If a valid key ID is specified in arg2
, and the key exists,
then this operation simply returns the key ID. If the key does not
exist, the call fails with error ENOKEY.
The caller must have search
permission on a keyring in order
for it to be found.
The arguments arg4
and arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(3).
Replace the session keyring this process subscribes to with a new session keyring.
If arg2
is NULL, an anonymous keyring with the description
"_ses" is created and the process is subscribed to that keyring as its
session keyring, displacing the previous session keyring.
Otherwise, arg2
(cast to char *
) is treated as the
description (name) of a keyring, and the behavior is as follows:
If a keyring with a matching description exists, the process will
attempt to subscribe to that keyring as its session keyring if possible;
if that is not possible, an error is returned. In order to subscribe to
the keyring, the caller must have search
permission on the
keyring.
If a keyring with a matching description does not exist, then a new keyring with the specified description is created, and the process is subscribed to that keyring as its session keyring.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_join_session_keyring(3).
Update a key's data payload.
The arg2
argument (cast to key_serial_t
) specifies
the ID of the key to be updated. The arg3
argument (cast to
void *
) points to the new payload and arg4
(cast to
size_t
) contains the new payload size in bytes.
The caller must have write
permission on the key specified
and the key type must support updating.
A negatively instantiated key (see the description of KEYCTL_REJECT) can be positively instantiated with this operation.
The arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_update(3).
Revoke the key with the ID provided in arg2
(cast to
key_serial_t
). The key is scheduled for garbage collection; it
will no longer be findable, and will be unavailable for further
operations. Further attempts to use the key will fail with the error
EKEYREVOKED.
The caller must have write
or setattr
permission on
the key.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_revoke(3).
Change the ownership (user and group ID) of a key.
The arg2
argument (cast to key_serial_t
) contains
the key ID. The arg3
argument (cast to uid_t
) contains
the new user ID (or -1 in case the user ID shouldn't be changed). The
arg4
argument (cast to gid_t
) contains the new group
ID (or -1 in case the group ID shouldn't be changed).
The key must grant the caller setattr
permission.
For the UID to be changed, or for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the caller must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (see capabilities(7)).
If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to the new user should the UID be changed.
The arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_chown(3).
Change the permissions of the key with the ID provided in the
arg2
argument (cast to key_serial_t
) to the
permissions provided in the arg3
argument (cast to
key_perm_t
).
If the caller doesn't have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability, it can change permissions only for the keys it owns. (More precisely: the caller's filesystem UID must match the UID of the key.)
The key must grant setattr
permission to the caller
regardless
of the caller's capabilities.
The permissions in arg3
specify masks of available
operations for each of the following user categories:
possessor
(since Linux 2.6.14)This is the permission granted to a process that possesses the key (has it attached searchably to one of the process's keyrings); see keyrings(7).
user
This is the permission granted to a process whose filesystem UID matches the UID of the key.
group
This is the permission granted to a process whose filesystem GID or any of its supplementary GIDs matches the GID of the key.
other
This is the permission granted to other processes that do not match
the user
and group
categories.
The user
, group
, and other
categories are
exclusive: if a process matches the user
category, it will not
receive permissions granted in the group
category; if a process
matches the user
or group
category, then it will not
receive permissions granted in the other
category.
The possessor
category grants permissions that are
cumulative with the grants from the user
, group
, or
other
category.
Each permission mask is eight bits in size, with only six bits currently used. The available permissions are:
view
This permission allows reading attributes of a key.
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_DESCRIBE operation.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_VIEW, KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_GRP_VIEW, and KEY_OTH_VIEW.
read
This permission allows reading a key's payload.
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_READ operation.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_READ, KEY_USR_READ, KEY_GRP_READ, and KEY_OTH_READ.
write
This permission allows update or instantiation of a key's payload. For a keyring, it allows keys to be linked and unlinked from the keyring,
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_UPDATE, KEYCTL_REVOKE, KEYCTL_CLEAR, KEYCTL_LINK, and KEYCTL_UNLINK operations.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_WRITE, KEY_USR_WRITE, KEY_GRP_WRITE, and KEY_OTH_WRITE.
search
This permission allows keyrings to be searched and keys to be found.
Searches can recurse only into nested keyrings that have search
permission set.
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID, KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, KEYCTL_SEARCH, and KEYCTL_INVALIDATE operations.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_USR_SEARCH, KEY_GRP_SEARCH, and KEY_OTH_SEARCH.
link
This permission allows a key or keyring to be linked to.
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT operations.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_LINK, KEY_USR_LINK, KEY_GRP_LINK, and KEY_OTH_LINK.
setattr
(since Linux 2.6.15).This permission allows a key's UID, GID, and permissions mask to be changed.
This permission is required for the KEYCTL_REVOKE, KEYCTL_CHOWN, and KEYCTL_SETPERM operations.
The permission bits for each category are KEY_POS_SETATTR, KEY_USR_SETATTR, KEY_GRP_SETATTR, and KEY_OTH_SETATTR.
As a convenience, the following macros are defined as masks for all of the permission bits in each of the user categories: KEY_POS_ALL, KEY_USR_ALL, KEY_GRP_ALL, and KEY_OTH_ALL.
The arg4
and arg5
arguments are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_setperm(3).
Obtain a string describing the attributes of a specified key.
The ID of the key to be described is specified in arg2
(cast
to key_serial_t
). The descriptive string is returned in the
buffer pointed to by arg3
(cast to char *
);
arg4
(cast to size_t
) specifies the size of that
buffer in bytes.
The key must grant the caller view
permission.
The returned string is null-terminated and contains the following information about the key:
type
;uid
;gid
;perm
;description
In the above,
type
anddescription
are strings,uid
andgid
are decimal strings, andperm
is a hexadecimal permissions mask. The descriptive string is written with the following format:
%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s
Note: the intention is that the descriptive string should be extensible in future kernel versions. In particular, the
description
field will not contain semicolons; it should be parsed by working backwards from the end of the string to find the last semicolon. This allows future semicolon-delimited fields to be inserted in the descriptive string in the future.
Writing to the buffer is attempted only when
arg3
is non-NULL and the specified buffer size is large enough to accept the descriptive string (including the terminating null byte). In order to determine whether the buffer size was too small, check to see if the return value of the operation is greater thanarg4
.
The
arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by
libkeyutils
via the function keyctl_describe(3).
Clear the contents of (i.e., unlink all keys from) a keyring.
The ID of the key (which must be of keyring type) is provided in
arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
).
The caller must have write
permission on the keyring.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_clear(3).
Create a link from a keyring to a key.
The key to be linked is specified in arg2
(cast to
key_serial_t
); the keyring is specified in arg3
(cast
to key_serial_t
).
If a key with the same type and description is already linked in the keyring, then that key is displaced from the keyring.
Before creating the link, the kernel checks the nesting of the keyrings and returns appropriate errors if the link would produce a cycle or if the nesting of keyrings would be too deep (The limit on the nesting of keyrings is determined by the kernel constant KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH, defined with the value 6, and is necessary to prevent overflows on the kernel stack when recursively searching keyrings).
The caller must have link
permission on the key being added
and write
permission on the keyring.
The arguments arg4
and arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_link(3).
Unlink a key from a keyring.
The ID of the key to be unlinked is specified in arg2
(cast
to key_serial_t
); the ID of the keyring from which it is to be
unlinked is specified in arg3
(cast to
key_serial_t
).
If the key is not currently linked into the keyring, an error results.
The caller must have write
permission on the keyring from
which the key is being removed.
If the last link to a key is removed, then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
The arguments arg4
and arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_unlink(3).
Search for a key in a keyring tree, returning its ID and optionally linking it to a specified keyring.
The tree to be searched is specified by passing the ID of the head
keyring in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). The search is
performed breadth-first and recursively.
The arg3
and arg4
arguments specify the key to be
searched for: arg3
(cast as char *
) contains the key
type (a null-terminated character string up to 32 bytes in size,
including the terminating null byte), and arg4
(cast as
char *
) contains the description of the key (a null-terminated
character string up to 4096 bytes in size, including the terminating
null byte).
The source keyring must grant search
permission to the
caller. When performing the recursive search, only keyrings that grant
the caller search
permission will be searched. Only keys with
for which the caller has search
permission can be found.
If the key is found, its ID is returned as the function result.
If the key is found and arg5
(cast to key_serial_t
)
is nonzero, then, subject to the same constraints and rules as
KEYCTL_LINK, the key is linked into the keyring whose
ID is specified in arg5
. If the destination keyring specified
in arg5
already contains a link to a key that has the same type
and description, then that link will be displaced by a link to the key
found by this operation.
Instead of valid existing keyring IDs, the source (arg2
) and
destination (arg5
) keyrings can be one of the special keyring
IDs listed under KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_search(3).
Read the payload data of a key.
The ID of the key whose payload is to be read is specified in
arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). This can be the ID of an
existing key, or any of the special key IDs listed for
KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID.
The payload is placed in the buffer pointed by arg3
(cast to
char *
); the size of that buffer must be specified in
arg4
(cast to size_t
).
The returned data will be processed for presentation according to the
key type. For example, a keyring will return an array of
key_serial_t
entries representing the IDs of all the keys that
are linked to it. The user
key type will return its data as is.
If a key type does not implement this function, the operation fails with
the error EOPNOTSUPP.
If arg3
is not NULL, as much of the payload data as will fit
is copied into the buffer. On a successful return, the return value is
always the total size of the payload data. To determine whether the
buffer was of sufficient size, check to see that the return value is
less than or equal to the value supplied in arg4
.
The key must either grant the caller read
permission, or
grant the caller search
permission when searched for from the
process keyrings (i.e., the key is possessed).
The arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_read(3).
(Positively) instantiate an uninstantiated key with a specified payload.
The ID of the key to be instantiated is provided in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
).
The key payload is specified in the buffer pointed to by
arg3
(cast to void *
); the size of that buffer is
specified in arg4
(cast to size_t
).
The payload may be a null pointer and the buffer size may be 0 if this is supported by the key type (e.g., it is a keyring).
The operation may be fail if the payload data is in the wrong format or is otherwise invalid.
If arg5
(cast to key_serial_t
) is nonzero, then,
subject to the same constraints and rules as
KEYCTL_LINK, the instantiated key is linked into the
keyring whose ID specified in arg5
.
The caller must have the appropriate authorization key, and once the uninstantiated key has been instantiated, the authorization key is revoked. In other words, this operation is available only from a request-key(8)-style program. See request_key(2) for an explanation of uninstantiated keys and key instantiation.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_instantiate(3).
Negatively instantiate an uninstantiated key.
This operation is equivalent to the call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_REJECT, arg2, arg3, ENOKEY, arg4);
The arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_negate(3).
Set the default keyring to which implicitly requested keys will be linked for this thread, and return the previous setting. Implicit key requests are those made by internal kernel components, such as can occur when, for example, opening files on an AFS or NFS filesystem. Setting the default keyring also has an effect when requesting a key from user space; see request_key(2) for details.
The arg2
argument (cast to int
) should contain one
of the following values, to specify the new default keyring:
Don't change the default keyring. This can be used to discover the current default keyring (without changing it).
This selects the default behaviour, which is to use the thread-specific keyring if there is one, otherwise the process-specific keyring if there is one, otherwise the session keyring if there is one, otherwise the UID-specific session keyring, otherwise the user-specific keyring.
Use the thread-specific keyring (thread-keyring(7)) as the new default keyring.
Use the process-specific keyring (process-keyring(7)) as the new default keyring.
Use the session-specific keyring (session-keyring(7)) as the new default keyring.
Use the UID-specific keyring (user-keyring(7)) as the new default keyring.
Use the UID-specific session keyring (user-session-keyring(7)) as the new default keyring.
Use the requestor keyring.
All other values are invalid.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
The setting controlled by this operation is inherited by the child of fork(2) and preserved across execve(2).
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(3).
Set a timeout on a key.
The ID of the key is specified in arg2
(cast to
key_serial_t
). The timeout value, in seconds from the current
time, is specified in arg3
(cast to unsigned int
). The
timeout is measured against the realtime clock.
Specifying the timeout value as 0 clears any existing timeout on the key.
The /proc/keys
file displays the remaining time until each
key will expire. (This is the only method of discovering the timeout on
a key.)
The caller must either have the setattr
permission on the
key or hold an instantiation authorization token for the key (see
request_key(2)).
The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires. Subsequent attempts to access the key will then fail with the error EKEYEXPIRED.
This operation cannot be used to set timeouts on revoked, expired, or negatively instantiated keys.
The arguments arg4
and arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_set_timeout(3).
Assume (or divest) the authority for the calling thread to instantiate a key.
The arg2
argument (cast to key_serial_t
) specifies
either a nonzero key ID to assume authority, or the value 0 to divest
authority.
If arg2
is nonzero, then it specifies the ID of an
uninstantiated key for which authority is to be assumed. That key can
then be instantiated using one of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE,
KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, KEYCTL_REJECT,
or KEYCTL_NEGATE. Once the key has been instantiated,
the thread is automatically divested of authority to instantiate the
key.
Authority over a key can be assumed only if the calling thread has
present in its keyrings the authorization key that is associated with
the specified key. (In other words, the
KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY operation is available only
from a request-key(8)-style program; see
request_key(2) for an explanation of how this operation
is used.) The caller must have search
permission on the
authorization key.
If the specified key has a matching authorization key, then the ID of that key is returned. The authorization key can be read (KEYCTL_READ) to obtain the callout information passed to request_key(2).
If the ID given in arg2
is 0, then the currently assumed
authority is cleared (divested), and the value 0 is returned.
The KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY mechanism allows a
program such as request-key(8) to assume the necessary
authority to instantiate a new uninstantiated key that was created as a
consequence of a call to request_key(2). For further
information, see request_key(2) and the kernel source
file Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt
.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_assume_authority(3).
Get the LSM (Linux Security Module) security label of the specified key.
The ID of the key whose security label is to be fetched is specified
in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). The security label
(terminated by a null byte) will be placed in the buffer pointed to by
arg3
argument (cast to char *
); the size of the buffer
must be provided in arg4
(cast to size_t
).
If arg3
is specified as NULL or the buffer size specified in
arg4
is too small, the full size of the security label string
(including the terminating null byte) is returned as the function
result, and nothing is copied to the buffer.
The caller must have view
permission on the specified
key.
The returned security label string will be rendered in a form appropriate to the LSM in force. For example, with SELinux, it may look like:
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
If no LSM is currently in force, then an empty string is placed in the buffer.
The arg5
argument is ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the functions
keyctl_get_security(3) and
keyctl_get_security_alloc(3).
Replace the session keyring to which the parent
of the
calling process subscribes with the session keyring of the calling
process.
The keyring will be replaced in the parent process at the point where the parent next transitions from kernel space to user space.
The keyring must exist and must grant the caller link
permission. The parent process must be single-threaded and have the same
effective ownership as this process and must not be set-user-ID or
set-group-ID. The UID of the parent process's existing session keyring
(f it has one), as well as the UID of the caller's session keyring much
match the caller's effective UID.
The fact that it is the parent process that is affected by this operation allows a program such as the shell to start a child process that uses this operation to change the shell's session keyring. (This is what the keyctl(1) new_session command does.)
The arguments arg2
, arg3
, arg4
, and
arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_session_to_parent(3).
Mark a key as negatively instantiated and set an expiration timer on the key. This operation provides a superset of the functionality of the earlier KEYCTL_NEGATE operation.
The ID of the key that is to be negatively instantiated is specified
in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). The arg3
(cast to unsigned int
) argument specifies the lifetime of the
key, in seconds. The arg4
argument (cast to unsigned
int) specifies the error to be returned when a search hits this
key; typically, this is one of EKEYREJECTED,
EKEYREVOKED, or EKEYEXPIRED.
If arg5
(cast to key_serial_t
) is nonzero, then,
subject to the same constraints and rules as
KEYCTL_LINK, the negatively instantiated key is linked
into the keyring whose ID is specified in arg5
.
The caller must have the appropriate authorization key. In other words, this operation is available only from a request-key(8)-style program. See request_key(2).
The caller must have the appropriate authorization key, and once the uninstantiated key has been instantiated, the authorization key is revoked. In other words, this operation is available only from a request-key(8)-style program. See request_key(2) for an explanation of uninstantiated keys and key instantiation.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_reject(3).
Instantiate an uninstantiated key with a payload specified via a vector of buffers.
This operation is the same as KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE,
but the payload data is specified as an array of iovec
structures (see iovec(3type)).
The pointer to the payload vector is specified in arg3
(cast
as const struct iovec *
). The number of items in the vector is
specified in arg4
(cast as unsigned int
).
The arg2
(key ID) and arg5
(keyring ID) are
interpreted as for KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_instantiate_iov(3).
Mark a key as invalid.
The ID of the key to be invalidated is specified in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
).
To invalidate a key, the caller must have search
permission
on the key.
This operation marks the key as invalid and schedules immediate garbage collection. The garbage collector removes the invalidated key from all keyrings and deletes the key when its reference count reaches zero. After this operation, the key will be ignored by all searches, even if it is not yet deleted.
Keys that are marked invalid become invisible to normal key
operations immediately, though they are still visible in
/proc/keys
(marked with an 'i' flag) until they are actually
removed.
The arguments arg3
, arg4
, and arg5
are
ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_invalidate(3).
Get the persistent keyring (persistent-keyring(7)) for a specified user and link it to a specified keyring.
The user ID is specified in arg2
(cast to uid_t
).
If the value -1 is specified, the caller's real user ID is used. The ID
of the destination keyring is specified in arg3
(cast to
key_serial_t
).
The caller must have the CAP_SETUID capability in its user namespace in order to fetch the persistent keyring for a user ID that does not match either the real or effective user ID of the caller.
If the call is successful, a link to the persistent keyring is added
to the keyring whose ID was specified in arg3
.
The caller must have write
permission on the keyring.
The persistent keyring will be created by the kernel if it does not yet exist.
Each time the KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT operation is performed, the persistent keyring will have its expiration timeout reset to the value in:
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/persistent_keyring_expiry
Should the timeout be reached, the persistent keyring will be removed and everything it pins can then be garbage collected.
Persistent keyrings were added in Linux 3.13.
The arguments arg4
and arg5
are ignored.
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
via the function
keyctl_get_persistent(3).
Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key, optionally applying key derivation function (KDF) to the result.
The arg2
argument is a pointer to a set of parameters
containing serial numbers for three "user"
keys used in the
Diffie-Hellman calculation, packaged in a structure of the following
form:
struct keyctl_dh_params {
int32_t private; /* The local private key */
int32_t prime; /* The prime, known to both parties */
int32_t base; /* The base integer: either a shared
generator or the remote public key */
};
Each of the three keys specified in this structure must grant the
caller read
permission. The payloads of these keys are used to
calculate the Diffie-Hellman result as:
base ^ private mod prime
If the base is the shared generator, the result is the local public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is the shared secret.
The arg3
argument (cast to char *
) points to a
buffer where the result of the calculation is placed. The size of that
buffer is specified in arg4
(cast to size_t
).
The buffer must be large enough to accommodate the output data,
otherwise an error is returned. If arg4
is specified zero, in
which case the buffer is not used and the operation returns the minimum
required buffer size (i.e., the length of the prime).
Diffie-Hellman computations can be performed in user space, but require a multiple-precision integer (MPI) library. Moving the implementation into the kernel gives access to the kernel MPI implementation, and allows access to secure or acceleration hardware.
Adding support for DH computation to the keyctl() system call was considered a good fit due to the DH algorithm's use for deriving shared keys; it also allows the type of the key to determine which DH implementation (software or hardware) is appropriate.
If the arg5
argument is NULL, then the DH
result itself is returned. Otherwise (since Linux 4.12), it is a pointer
to a structure which specifies parameters of the KDF operation to be
applied:
struct keyctl_kdf_params {
char *hashname; /* Hash algorithm name */
char *otherinfo; /* SP800-56A OtherInfo */
__u32 otherinfolen; /* Length of otherinfo data */
__u32 __spare[8]; /* Reserved */
};
The hashname
field is a null-terminated string which
specifies a hash name (available in the kernel's crypto API; the list of
the hashes available is rather tricky to observe; please refer to the https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/crypto/architecture.html">"Kernel
Crypto API Architecture" documentation for the information regarding
how hash names are constructed and your kernel's source and
configuration regarding what ciphers and templates with type
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH are available) to be applied to
DH result in KDF operation.
The otherinfo
field is an OtherInfo
data as
described in SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2 and is algorithm-specific. This
data is concatenated with the result of DH operation and is provided as
an input to the KDF operation. Its size is provided in the
otherinfolen
field and is limited by
KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN constant that defined in
security/keys/internal.h
to a value of 64.
The __spare field is currently unused. It was ignored until Linux 4.13 (but still should be user-addressable since it is copied to the kernel), and should contain zeros since Linux 4.13.
The KDF implementation complies with SP800-56A as well as with SP800-108 (the counter KDF).
This operation is exposed by libkeyutils
(from
libkeyutils
1.5.10 onwards) via the functions
keyctl_dh_compute(3) and
keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(3).
Apply a key-linking restriction to the keyring with the ID provided
in arg2
(cast to key_serial_t
). The caller must have
setattr
permission on the key. If arg3
is NULL, any
attempt to add a key to the keyring is blocked; otherwise it contains a
pointer to a string with a key type name and arg4
contains a
pointer to string that describes the type-specific restriction. As of
Linux 4.12, only the type "asymmetric" has restrictions defined:
Allows only keys that are signed by a key linked to the built-in keyring (".builtin_trusted_keys").
Allows only keys that are signed by a key linked to the secondary keyring (".secondary_trusted_keys") or, by extension, a key in a built-in keyring, as the latter is linked to the former.
key
key
:chainIf key
specifies the ID of a key of type "asymmetric", then
only keys that are signed by this key are allowed.
If key
specifies the ID of a keyring, then only keys that
are signed by a key linked to this keyring are allowed.
If ":chain" is specified, keys that are signed by a keys linked to
the destination keyring (that is, the keyring with the ID specified in
the arg2
argument) are also allowed.
Note that a restriction can be configured only once for the specified keyring; once a restriction is set, it can't be overridden.
The argument arg5
is ignored.
For a successful call, the return value depends on the operation:
The ID of the requested keyring.
The ID of the joined session keyring.
The size of the description (including the terminating null byte), irrespective of the provided buffer size.
The ID of the key that was found.
The amount of data that is available in the key, irrespective of the provided buffer size.
The ID of the previous default keyring to which implicitly requested keys were linked (one of KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_*).
Either 0, if the ID given was 0, or the ID of the authorization key matching the specified key, if a nonzero key ID was provided.
The size of the LSM security label string (including the terminating null byte), irrespective of the provided buffer size.
The ID of the persistent keyring.
The number of bytes copied to the buffer, or, if arg4
is 0,
the required buffer size.
Zero.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno
is set to indicate the
error.
The program below provide subset of the functionality of the
request-key(8) program provided by the
keyutils
package. For informational purposes, the program
records various information in a log file.
As described in request_key(2), the request-key(8) program is invoked with command-line arguments that describe a key that is to be instantiated. The example program fetches and logs these arguments. The program assumes authority to instantiate the requested key, and then instantiates that key.
The following shell session demonstrates the use of this program. In the session, we compile the program and then use it to temporarily replace the standard request-key(8) program. (Note that temporarily disabling the standard request-key(8) program may not be safe on some systems.) While our example program is installed, we use the example program shown in request_key(2) to request a key.
$ cc -o key_instantiate key_instantiate.c -lkeyutils
$ sudo mv /sbin/request-key /sbin/request-key.backup
$ sudo cp key_instantiate /sbin/request-key
$ ./t_request_key user mykey somepayloaddata
Key ID is 20d035bf
$ sudo mv /sbin/request-key.backup /sbin/request-key
Looking at the log file created by this program, we can see the command-line arguments supplied to our example program:
$ cat /tmp/key_instantiate.log
Time: Mon Nov 7 13:06:47 2016
Command line arguments:
argv[0]: /sbin/request-key
operation: create
key_to_instantiate: 20d035bf
UID: 1000
GID: 1000
thread_keyring: 0
process_keyring: 0
session_keyring: 256e6a6
Key description: user;1000;1000;3f010000;mykey
Auth key payload: somepayloaddata
Destination keyring: 256e6a6
Auth key description: .request_key_auth;1000;1000;0b010000;20d035bf
The last few lines of the above output show that the example program was able to fetch:
the description of the key to be instantiated, which included the
name of the key (mykey
);
the payload of the authorization key, which consisted of the data
(somepayloaddata
) passed to
request_key(2);
the destination keyring that was specified in the call to request_key(2); and
the description of the authorization key, where we can see that
the name of the authorization key matches the ID of the key that is to
be instantiated (20d035bf
).
The example program in request_key(2) specified the
destination keyring as KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING. By
examining the contents of /proc/keys
, we can see that this was
translated to the ID of the destination keyring (0256e6a6
)
shown in the log output above; we can also see the newly created key
with the name mykey
and ID 20d035bf
.
$ cat /proc/keys | egrep 'mykey|256e6a6'
0256e6a6 I--Q--- 194 perm 3f030000 1000 1000 keyring _ses: 3
20d035bf I--Q--- 1 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user mykey: 16
/* key_instantiate.c */
#include <errno.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <time.h>
#ifndef KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING
#define KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING (-8)
#endif
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int akp_size; /* Size of auth_key_payload */
int auth_key;
char dbuf[256];
char auth_key_payload[256];
char *operation;
FILE *fp;
gid_t gid;
uid_t uid;
time_t t;
key_serial_t key_to_instantiate, dest_keyring;
key_serial_t thread_keyring, process_keyring, session_keyring;
if (argc != 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s op key uid gid thread_keyring "
"process_keyring session_keyring\n", argv[0]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fp = fopen("/tmp/key_instantiate.log", "w");
if (fp == NULL)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
setbuf(fp, NULL);
t = time(NULL);
fprintf(fp, "Time: %s\n", ctime(&t));
/*
* The kernel passes a fixed set of arguments to the program
* that it execs; fetch them.
*/
operation = argv[1];
key_to_instantiate = atoi(argv[2]);
uid = atoi(argv[3]);
gid = atoi(argv[4]);
thread_keyring = atoi(argv[5]);
process_keyring = atoi(argv[6]);
session_keyring = atoi(argv[7]);
fprintf(fp, "Command line arguments:\n");
fprintf(fp, " argv[0]: %s\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(fp, " operation: %s\n", operation);
fprintf(fp, " key_to_instantiate: %jx\n",
(uintmax_t) key_to_instantiate);
fprintf(fp, " UID: %jd\n", (intmax_t) uid);
fprintf(fp, " GID: %jd\n", (intmax_t) gid);
fprintf(fp, " thread_keyring: %jx\n",
(uintmax_t) thread_keyring);
fprintf(fp, " process_keyring: %jx\n",
(uintmax_t) process_keyring);
fprintf(fp, " session_keyring: %jx\n",
(uintmax_t) session_keyring);
fprintf(fp, "\n");
/*
* Assume the authority to instantiate the key named in argv[2].
*/
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY, key_to_instantiate) == -1) {
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Fetch the description of the key that is to be instantiated.
*/
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key_to_instantiate,
dbuf, sizeof(dbuf)) == -1) {
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_DESCRIBE failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fprintf(fp, "Key description: %s\n", dbuf);
/*
* Fetch the payload of the authorization key, which is
* actually the callout data given to request_key().
*/
akp_size = keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY,
auth_key_payload, sizeof(auth_key_payload));
if (akp_size == -1) {
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_READ failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
auth_key_payload[akp_size] = '\0';
fprintf(fp, "Auth key payload: %s\n", auth_key_payload);
/*
* For interest, get the ID of the authorization key and
* display it.
*/
auth_key = keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID,
KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY);
if (auth_key == -1) {
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fprintf(fp, "Auth key ID: %jx\n", (uintmax_t) auth_key);
/*
* Fetch key ID for the request_key(2) destination keyring.
*/
dest_keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID,
KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING);
if (dest_keyring == -1) {
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fprintf(fp, "Destination keyring: %jx\n", (uintmax_t) dest_keyring);
/*
* Fetch the description of the authorization key. This
* allows us to see the key type, UID, GID, permissions,
* and description (name) of the key. Among other things,
* we will see that the name of the key is a hexadecimal
* string representing the ID of the key to be instantiated.
*/
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY,
dbuf, sizeof(dbuf)) == -1)
{
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_DESCRIBE failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fprintf(fp, "Auth key description: %s\n", dbuf);
/*
* Instantiate the key using the callout data that was supplied
* in the payload of the authorization key.
*/
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_to_instantiate,
auth_key_payload, akp_size + 1, dest_keyring) == -1)
{
fprintf(fp, "KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
The requested operation wasn't permitted.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and there
was an error during crypto module initialization.
operation
was KEYCTL_LINK and the requested
link would result in a cycle.
operation
was KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING and
the requested keyring restriction would result in a cycle.
The key quota for the caller's user would be exceeded by creating a key or linking it to the keyring.
operation
was KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING and
keyring provided in arg2
argument already has a restriction
set.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and one of
the following has failed:
copying of the struct keyctl_dh_params
, provided in the
arg2
argument, from user space;
copying of the struct keyctl_kdf_params
, provided in the
non-NULL arg5
argument, from user space (in case kernel
supports performing KDF operation on DH operation result);
copying of data pointed by the hashname
field of the
struct keyctl_kdf_params
from user space;
copying of data pointed by the otherinfo
field of the
struct keyctl_kdf_params
from user space if the
otherinfolen
field was nonzero;
copying of the result to user space.
operation
was KEYCTL_SETPERM and an invalid
permission bit was specified in arg3
.
operation
was KEYCTL_SEARCH and the size of
the description in arg4
(including the terminating null byte)
exceeded 4096 bytes.
size of the string (including the terminating null byte) specified in
arg3
(the key type) or arg4
(the key description)
exceeded the limit (32 bytes and 4096 bytes respectively).
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, argument
arg5
was non-NULL.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE And the
digest size of the hashing algorithm supplied is zero.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
buffer size provided is not enough to hold the result. Provide 0 as a
buffer size in order to obtain the minimum buffer size.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
hash name provided in the hashname
field of the struct
keyctl_kdf_params pointed by arg5
argument is too big (the
limit is implementation-specific and varies between kernel versions, but
it is deemed big enough for all valid algorithm names).
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
__spare
field of the struct keyctl_kdf_params
provided
in the arg5
argument contains nonzero values.
An expired key was found or specified.
A rejected key was found or specified.
A revoked key was found or specified.
operation
was KEYCTL_LINK and the requested
link would cause the maximum nesting depth for keyrings to be
exceeded.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
buffer length exceeds KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN (which
is 1024 currently) or the otherinfolen
field of the struct
keyctl_kdf_parms passed in arg5
exceeds
KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN (which is 64 currently).
operation
was KEYCTL_LINK and the keyring
is full. (Before Linux 3.13, the available space for storing keyring
links was limited to a single page of memory; since Linux 3.13, there is
no fixed limit.)
operation
was KEYCTL_UNLINK and the key to
be unlinked isn't linked to the keyring.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
hashing algorithm specified in the hashname
field of the
struct keyctl_kdf_params
pointed by arg5
argument
hasn't been found.
operation
was KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING and
the type provided in arg3
argument doesn't support setting key
linking restrictions.
No matching key was found or an invalid key was specified.
The value KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID was specified in
operation
, the key specified in arg2
did not exist,
and arg3
was zero (meaning don't create the key if it didn't
exist).
One of kernel memory allocation routines failed during the execution of the syscall.
A key of keyring type was expected but the ID of a key with a different type was provided.
operation
was KEYCTL_READ and the key type
does not support reading (e.g., the type is "login"
).
operation
was KEYCTL_UPDATE and the key
type does not support updating.
operation
was KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, the
type provided in arg3
argument was "asymmetric", and the key
specified in the restriction specification provided in arg4
has
type other than "asymmetric" or "keyring".
operation
was KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT,
arg2
specified a UID other than the calling thread's real or
effective UID, and the caller did not have the
CAP_SETUID capability.
operation
was KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT and
either: all of the UIDs (GIDs) of the parent process do not match the
effective UID (GID) of the calling process; the UID of the parent's
existing session keyring or the UID of the caller's session keyring did
not match the effective UID of the caller; the parent process is not
single-thread; or the parent process is init(1) or a
kernel thread.
operation
was KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE and the
initialization of crypto modules has timed out.
A wrapper is provided in the libkeyutils
library. (The
accompanying package provides the <keyutils.h>
header
file.) However, rather than using this system call directly, you
probably want to use the various library functions mentioned in the
descriptions of individual operations above.
Linux.
Linux 2.6.10.
keyctl(1), add_key(2), request_key(2), keyctl(3), keyctl_assume_authority(3), keyctl_chown(3), keyctl_clear(3), keyctl_describe(3), keyctl_describe_alloc(3), keyctl_dh_compute(3), keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(3), keyctl_get_keyring_ID(3), keyctl_get_persistent(3), keyctl_get_security(3), keyctl_get_security_alloc(3), keyctl_instantiate(3), keyctl_instantiate_iov(3), keyctl_invalidate(3), keyctl_join_session_keyring(3), keyctl_link(3), keyctl_negate(3), keyctl_read(3), keyctl_read_alloc(3), keyctl_reject(3), keyctl_revoke(3), keyctl_search(3), keyctl_session_to_parent(3), keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(3), keyctl_set_timeout(3), keyctl_setperm(3), keyctl_unlink(3), keyctl_update(3), recursive_key_scan(3), recursive_session_key_scan(3), capabilities(7), credentials(7), keyrings(7), keyutils(7), persistent-keyring(7), process-keyring(7), session-keyring(7), thread-keyring(7), user-keyring(7), user_namespaces(7), user-session-keyring(7), request-key(8)
The kernel source files under Documentation/security/keys/
(or, before Linux 4.13, in the file
Documentation/security/keys.txt
).