bzero, explicit_bzero - zero a byte string
Standard C library (libc, -lc)
#include <strings.h>
void bzero(void s[.n], size_t n);
#include <string.h>
void explicit_bzero(void s[.n], size_t n);The bzero() function erases the data in the
n bytes of the memory starting at the location pointed to by
s, by writing zeros (bytes containing '\0') to that area.
The explicit_bzero() function performs the same task as bzero(). It differs from bzero() in that it guarantees that compiler optimizations will not remove the erase operation if the compiler deduces that the operation is "unnecessary".
None.
For an explanation of the terms used in this section, see attributes(7).
| Interface | Attribute | Value |
bzero(), explicit_bzero() |
Thread safety | MT-Safe |
None.
glibc 2.25.
The explicit_bzero() function is a nonstandard extension that is also present on some of the BSDs. Some other implementations have a similar function, such as memset_explicit() or memset_s().
4.3BSD.
Marked as LEGACY in POSIX.1-2001. Removed in POSIX.1-2008.
The explicit_bzero() function addresses a problem
that security-conscious applications may run into when using
bzero(): if the compiler can deduce that the location
to be zeroed will never again be touched by a correct program,
then it may remove the bzero() call altogether. This is
a problem if the intent of the bzero() call was to
erase sensitive data (e.g., passwords) to prevent the possibility that
the data was leaked by an incorrect or compromised program. Calls to
explicit_bzero() are never optimized away by the
compiler.
The explicit_bzero() function does not solve all problems associated with erasing sensitive data:
The explicit_bzero() function does not
guarantee that sensitive data is completely erased from memory. (The
same is true of bzero().) For example, there may be
copies of the sensitive data in a register and in "scratch" stack areas.
The explicit_bzero() function is not aware of these
copies, and can't erase them.
In some circumstances, explicit_bzero() can
decrease security. If the compiler determined that the variable
containing the sensitive data could be optimized to be stored in a
register (because it is small enough to fit in a register, and no
operation other than the explicit_bzero() call would
need to take the address of the variable), then the
explicit_bzero() call will force the data to be copied
from the register to a location in RAM that is then immediately erased
(while the copy in the register remains unaffected). The problem here is
that data in RAM is more likely to be exposed by a bug than data in a
register, and thus the explicit_bzero() call creates a
brief time window where the sensitive data is more vulnerable than it
would otherwise have been if no attempt had been made to erase the
data.
Note that declaring the sensitive variable with the
volatile qualifier does not eliminate the
above problems. Indeed, it will make them worse, since, for example, it
may force a variable that would otherwise have been optimized into a
register to instead be maintained in (more vulnerable) RAM for its
entire lifetime.
Notwithstanding the above details, for security-conscious applications, using explicit_bzero() is generally preferable to not using it. The developers of explicit_bzero() anticipate that future compilers will recognize calls to explicit_bzero() and take steps to ensure that all copies of the sensitive data are erased, including copies in registers or in "scratch" stack areas.